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is in conformity with Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, supra. (25 Harv; L. Rev.
553.) Schemmel v. Atlas Bank repudiates Port v. Russel and seems to go
even beyond Wainwright v. P. H. & F. M. Roots Co. in requiring proof of
unfair dealing where interested parties are required to make up the quorum.
But in such cases the burden always lies on director to prove no advantage
was taken of his position. Drennen v. So. States Fire Ins. Co., 252 Fed.
776.
Laches is tantamount to ratification, Pittsburgh, etc. R. R. v. Keokuk,
etc., Bridge Co., 131 U. S. 271, and action must be taken within a reasonable time, Stephany v. Marsden, 78 N. J. Eq. 90. There is no laches where
the corporation is entirely in control of the erring directors, Klein v. Independent Brewery Assn., 83 N. E. 434. In the principal case court found a
majority of the directors to be innocent and ignorant of the constructive
fraud. Notice to agent adversely interested is not notice to the principal.
Brannen -v. May, 42 Ind. 92.
It is difficult, on the findings of fact, to reconcile the relationship of
principal and agent with the verdict and under the facts as stated in the
opinion, the decision appears doubtful even under the sui generis doctrine
of directors and corporation, because of the apparent laches here.
$.. G.
BANKS AND BANKING-RIGHT TO PREFERENC--SPECIAL DEPosrr-The

material facts involved here are simple and may be stated briefly: Plaintiff
deposited certain Liberty bonds with receiver's bank and latter gave him
a written receipt therefor, and agreed therein that on the surrender of
such receipt after sixty days' written notice by either party it would
deliver bonds of the same issue and amount and would pay interest semiannually on the par value of such bonds at the rate of three-quarters of
1 per cent per annum, in addition to the rate of interest payable on the
bonds. The bank sold the bonds and the proceeds from the bonds were
used to augment the assets of the bank. The bank subsequently suspended
business. The plaintiff filed his complaint asking that the said bonds or
other bonds of the same issue be returned to him, or, in case that was impossible, that he recover the value of such bonds and that his claim be
decreed a preferred claim and be paid before the payment of the general
claims. The defendant as receiver was ordered to pay plaintiff before
paying the general creditors of the bank and from that order the defendant
takes this appeal. Held: Order below affirmed. That the transaction
betwen the plaintiff and the bank was a special deposit and created the
relation of bailor and bailee between the parties, and that as a consequence
the plaintiff was entitled to a preference over the general creditors. Stults
v. Gordon. Appellate Court of Indiana, August 28, 1929. 167 N. E. 564.
Clearly the plaintiff is entitled to a preference if there was a mere
bailment involved here. The correctness of the court's decision turns upon
the proper relationship which grew out of the agreement between the
plaintiff and the bank. An analysis of this agreement discloses: first,
bonds of the same issue and amount (but not the -identical bonds) were
to be returned to plaintiff on 60 days' notice having been given by either
party; second, the bank was to pay interest semi-annually on the par
value of such bonds at the rate of three-quarters of 1 per cent in addition
to the rate of interest payable on the bonds.

RECENT CASE NOTES
Negotiable paper is intended to pass in commerce like money. Merchant's Loan & Trust Co. v. Lamson, 90 Ill. App. 18; Bouvier's Institutes,
vol. 1, p. 458; Depew v. Rhodes, 17 Mo. 580; Moses v. Hancock (1899),
2 Q. B. D. 3; Springfield First Nat. Bank v. Skeen, 101 Mo. 683, 14 S. W.
732, 11 L. R. A. 748; 3 R. C. L. 836. The fact, therefore, that bonds
instead of money were deposited here is considered of no material consequence. No distinction shall be made in the cases cited merely because
the res there involved was money, whereas here it was bonds.
Our Appellate Court cites but one case, Tyler County State Bank v.
Shivers (Tex. Civ. App.), 281 S. W. 264, to support its conclusion that
there was a bailment involved in the principal case. But in the Texas
case one material fact was lacking that is present in this case which seems
almost conclusive. Here the bank agreed to pay "three-quarters of 1 per
cent interest in addition to the rate of interest payable on the bonds." In
the Texas case cited in support of the instant decision there was no agreement touching on the question of interest. What was the effect of this
agreement to pay interest?
"The obligation to pay interest upon deposited money imports naturally
that the money may be used to earn money from which the interest may
be paid, which increment from the use of the money would come to the
depositor directly had the deposit not been made. Such an arrangement
presumptively creates a debt as distinguished from a trust obligation."
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Purithn Motors Corporation, 244 Mass. 259, 138
N. E. 321, 323 (1923); Tucker v. Linn (N. J. Ch.), 57 At. 1017 (1904);
Pittsburgh Nat. Bank v. McMurray, 98 Pa. 538, 40 (1881); In re Broad,
Ex Parte Neck, 13 Q. B. D. 740 (1884); In re Gothenburg Commerce Co.,
29 W. R. 358 (English-opinion by Sir G. Jessel). The instant opinion
does not discuss this point in rendering its decision. The writer considers
it important to, if not conclusive of, the question involved.
"A 'special deposit' implies the custody of property without authority
in the custodian to use it, and the right of owner to receive back the
identical thing deposited." (Our italics.)
Tuckerman v. Mearns, 262 F.
607, 49 App. D. C. 153; 3 R. C. L. 522. See also, Bacon v. State Bank of
Koniah, 41 Idaho 518, 240 Pac. 194; Schulz v. Bank of Harrisonville, 240
S. W. 614 (Mo. App. 1923). In the first preceding paragraph it was
pointed out that payment of interest "imports naturally that the money
may be used, etc." But a "special deposit" as defined in Tuckerman v.
Mearns, supra, precludes such a dealing with the res. The agreement in
the principal case did not require the return of identical bonds, but only
bonds of the "same issue and amount." This latter feature would also
take the agreement in the principal case out of the definition of a special
deposit as laid down in the Tuckerman case. That the identical thing must
be returned to constitute a special deposit see: Spry v. Hirning, 191 N. W.
833, 46 S. D. 237; Koetting v. State, 88 Wis. 502, 60 N. W. 822; Bank v.
Dean, 9 Okla. 626, 60 Pac. 226; Association v. Jacobs, 141 Ill. 261, 31 N. E.
414, 16 L. R. A. 516, 33 Am. St. Rep. 302, 5 Cyc. 199.
To this rule two well-established exceptions may be noted: first, grain
stored in public warehouses. Hall v. Pillsbury, 43 Minn. 33, 44 N. W. 673, 8
Harv. L. Rev. 432; second, certificates of corporate stock, Taussig V. Hart,
58 N. Y. 425. A possible third exception is the case of goods in possession
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of a factor. Norwegian Plow Co. v. Clark, 102 Iowa 31, 71 N. W. 808.
In most jurisdictions, money has not been held to form an exception to the
rule stated. Maine Bank v. Thomas, 28 Ill. 463; Davis v. Smith, 29 Minn.
201, 12 N. W. 531; In re State Bank, 56 Minn. 119, 57 N. W. 336; Rozelle
v. Rhodes, 116 Pa. St. 129, 9 Atl. 160; Shoemaker v. Hinze, 53 Wis. 116,
10 N. W. 86.
Even in Texas it has been held that "a special deposit is the placing
of something in the custody of the bank of which special restitution must
be made

.

.

.

to be kept by the bank and specifically returned and

form no part of the bank's disposable capital." Tyler County State Bank v.
Rhodes, 256 S. W. 947 (Tex. Civ. App.). Would the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals have said in the Shivers case, supra, that the payment of interest
entitled the bank to use the thing deposited as part of the "bank's disposable
property?"
It is submitted that, on the facts and reasoning of the cases cited above,
the relation between the parties was not that of bailor and bailee. It is
suggested that the agreement created the relation of creditor and debtorthat there was a mere loan-a time deposit here. If the plaintiff and the
bank became creditor and debtor respectively, it necessarily follows that the
plaintiff was not entitled to a preference.
T. R. D.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-TORT ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST HusBAND-The

plaintiff sustained injuries in an automobile accident while riding with
her husband, the defendant. The plaintiff brings this action for damages
for said injuries. The defendant interposes a demurrer to the complaint.
Held: Demurrer sustained. Blickenstaff v. Blickenstaff. Appellate Court
of Indiana, July 5, 1929, 167 N. E. 146.
By the fiction of the common law the husband and wife became one
legal person. The legal existence of the woman was merged in that of the
husband; the woman lost all legal identity by marriage. 1 Blackstone's
Commentaries 442. The inability of a wife to sue her husband at common
law was based on the principle that the husband and wife were one in law,
and not upon the theory that the wife was under legal disability. Barnett
v. Harshbarger,105 Ind. 410; Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287. At common law a married woman had no substantive rights. "There is not only
no civil remedy but no civil right during coverture to be redressed at any
time." Phillips v. Barnett, 1 Q. B. D. 436. It has been decided that the
statute giving married women greater liberty in bringing suits merely
changes the procedure, but gives no new rights. Henneger v. Lomas, supra.
The above fiction has been broken in Indiana by the following statute:
Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sections 8738-8762, and 262. It is said that to
allow a wife to sue her husband in tort is opposed to public policy. It is
submitted that such a suit is no more against public policy than a divorce
suit in which the entire marriage relation is exposed; and also, after
a husband commits a tort on his wife the sanctity of the marriage relation,
which public policy seeks to protect, has been destroyed.
"A married woman may sue alone--First. When the action concerns
her separate property. Second. When the action is between herself and

